Study on the Development of Transboundary Natural Resource Management Areas in Southern Africa

COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVES

Simon C. Metcalfe

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CONTENTS

Background to the Study

"Regional cooperation is not an optional extra; it is a matter of survival."

SADC Policy and Strategy for Environment and
Sustainable Development (ELMS, 1993, p.3)

International borders are political, not ecological, boundaries. As such, key ecological systems and components often occur in two or more nations and are subject to a range of often opposing management and land-use practices. In order to ensure that future generations have sufficient access to natural resources, the management of water catchments, ecosystems, and migratory wildlife must become more multinational and participatory across local, national, and international levels.

USAID's Regional Center for Southern Africa (RCSA) funded the Biodiversity Support Program (BSP), a USAID-funded consortium of World Wildlife Fund, The Nature Conservancy, and World Resources Institute, to conduct an assessment and preliminary analysis of issues, approaches, and targets of opportunity related to the development of transboundary natural resource management areas in southern Africa. Geographically, the study covered Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The study was implemented by the following team:

John Griffin	Team Leader and Institutional, Policy, and Legal Analyst
David Cumming	Conservation Biologist/Park Management Specialist (WWF SARPO)
Simon Metcalfe	Sociologist
Mike t' Sas-Rolfes	Economist
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Mary Rowen	USAID Liaison, Technical Advisor, and Editor (AAAS Fellow, USAID)
Judy Oglethorpe	Study Manager and Technical Advisor (Executive Director, BSP)

GIS support was provided by WWF SARPO (Southern Africa Regional Programme Office). Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) undertook a literature collection and established databases on TBCA literature and regional contacts. Zimbabwe Trust provided administrative and logistical support in the region. Dorothy Zbicz provided information on the number and distribution of TBCAs worldwide.

The study process consisted of the following: a review of relevant available literature; individual consultations in the region with stakeholders; development and circulation of draft papers on specific topics; three consultative meetings (with stakeholders, SASUSG members, and a large final meeting with regional stakeholders); and distribution of a draft final report for comment.

The five reports from the **Study on the Development of Transboundary Natural Resource Management Areas in Southern Africa** are as follows:

1. Main Report,

2. Environmental Context,

3. Community Perspectives,

4. Global Review, and

5. Highlights and Findings.

In addition to assisting USAID/RCSA in its strategic planning, this study, as well as the consultations and meetings associated with it, have encouraged and fostered TBNRM discussions in the region. It is hoped that the study's documents are used by all interested stakeholders to further the TBNRM process.

Clarifying Terminology: TBCA/TFCA and TBNRM

The terms *Transboundary Conservation Areas* (TBCA) and *Transfrontier Conservation Areas* (TFCA) are based upon the idea of some aspect of shared environmental management between nations. No real distinction exists between these two terms; they are used interchangeably in the region and in the literature.

The World Bank defines TFCAs as:

> *"Relatively large areas, which straddle frontiers (boundaries) between two or more countries and cover large-scale natural systems encompassing one or more protected areas."*
>
> World Bank, 1996

These terms were considered to have a strong "protected area" focus, and did not necessarily account for natural resource management outside of gazetted protected areas. Hence, the study team has coined a new term to incorporate a more holistic approach, known as Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM). TBNRM incorporates the concerns of natural resource management, people, political institutions, and national and international organisations, both inside and outside of gazetted protected areas.

The term *Transboundary Natural Resource Management Area* (TBNRMA) is defined as follows:

> *"An area in which cooperation to manage natural resources occurs across boundaries."*

The process itself is called *Transboundary Natural Resource Management* (TBNRM) and is defined as:

> *"Any process of cooperation across boundaries that facilitates or improves the management of natural resources (to the benefit of all parties in the area concerned)."*

The emphasis here is on the process, not the geographic area. Hence, if it serves the function of TBNRM, then it is a TBNRMA. A TBNRMA exists as soon as there occurs any type of TBNRM activity represented by some institution (be it a contract, protocol, management plan, or communication forum [formal or informal]).

1. Introduction: Communities and the Conservation Policy Discourse

This section of the study on the Development of Transboundary Natural Resource Management Areas (TBNRMAs) in southern Africa emphasises rural community perspectives. A substantial technical and institutional base has been developed over the last decade in the region related to Community-based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM).[i] The rapid growth of CBNRM initiatives has taken on characteristics of a programmatic, even a social, movement with a life of its own. Hundreds of communities are involved in the process, and many of them are situated in a transboundary context. These communities are well aware that political and administrative boundaries are often not contiguous with local cultural, ecological, or trade systems. National boundaries were not premised on community land-use perspectives; quite the reverse, as virtually all the "modern" national and administrative boundaries have required communities to make significant adjustments to their forms of social organisation and their means of meeting livelihood needs.

A large part of the apparent success of CBNRM has occurred because it focuses on communities themselves. It is profoundly hoped that this positive development is carried forward in relation to TBNRMAs, so that communities are not pushed to the margins of protected areas and form weak partnerships with governmental and private-sector agencies. The degree to which communities become real partners in, or only "beneficiaries" of, TBNRMA projects will be an important indicator of the long-term sociopolitical sustainability and strength of TBNRMA programs. Informal transboundary activities already exist between communities that could be nurtured further rather than be overwhelmed by increased regional political diplomacy, governmental bureaucracy, conservation advocacy, self-promoting publicity, and tourist market forces.

As local, national, and regional phenomena, who will dominate the "discourse" related to the promotion and establishment of TBCAs or TBNRMAs?[ii, iii] Despite millennia of coexistence with the African environment, the Indigenous Peoples were not active participants in the colonial discourse related to conservation (Crosby 1986; Anderson and Grove 1987). The dominant theme in species conservation related extinction as a consequence of human action, which generated the attempt to reserve places for nature and to separate humans from other species. The idea of "fortress conservation" dominated the discourse in sub-Saharan Africa. African communities were cast in the role of "poachers," and the state in the more glamorous role of "gamekeeper"' (Hulme and Murphree, forthcoming; MacKenzie 1987). The emergence of the "independent" political regimes alienated Western-based "conservationists" from management control of the new reserves, prompting a powerful European advocacy for Africa's wilderness values, exemplified in the vision behind "Serengeti Shall Not Die" (Grzimek 1960). The interests of the Maasai peoples in the Serengeti ecosystem (and hundreds of other communities in similar circumstances) were marginalised by a formal discourse maintained between Northern interests and new African governments.

Post-colonial Africa was launched into an ideologically divided world, and most of the new governments set about centralising authority and consolidating national unity. The traditional social organisation of communities was perceived as a threat, despite the fact that it provided the social cement that enabled states to function as societies (Hyden 1983). Initially, the new nation states uniformly reached down to command the political, development, and conservation agenda through their control of the policy arena, with Tanzania actually disbanding their

traditional leaders in 1962.[1] Across Africa, traditional "voices" were ignored and customary rules of access to land and natural resources were made subservient to state control. Rural Africans lost formal recognition of their Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS), especially in the face of democratic centralism. Governmental agencies administered communal land and resources for and with the people, leading to the formal dominance of civil communal society by the state, and communities became dependent on essentially weak governments. However, despite the state's attempted cooption of "community," traditional societies remained relatively intact because the state's "grasp was beyond its reach."

Since the 1980s, the dominant conservation discourse has been challenged, particularly in southern Africa. The new states lacked the capacity to manage communities through regulations and negative sanctions. To be effective, as well as popular, governments had to provide positive incentives to ensure that local peoples participated willingly in the conservation of biological resources as an integral aspect of their land-use practices. By the 1990s, the counter narrative, which supported CBNRM approaches, was ascending, supported by such global watershed meetings as the IVth World National Parks Conference (1992) and the Rio Summit. These, *inter alia*, emphasised the fact that Indigenous Peoples and local communities were primary stakeholders and partners in a common endeavour. The need for positive incentives is recognised in the discourse by the prevalence of such themes as property rights, sustainable use, resource values, and the equitable distribution of conservation costs and benefits (Munasinghe and McNeely 1994). Resource economics now plays a central role in identifying incentive-driven strategies that can link the conservation of biodiversity with the requirement for human agricultural and pastoral land use.

A new form of regional planning that encompasses a mosaic of land-use categories is indicated, including transboundary contexts. A broad approach linking protected areas with agricultural communities is far more likely to succeed than plans that are too narrowly based on conservation areas alone (McNeely 1995; Metcalfe 1995). Ecological, economic, and sociopolitical issues have to be addressed together. CBNRM addresses the participation of local communities in the process of establishing local resource management and compatibility in relation to lands situated in neighbouring areas, whether protected areas, communal, or private lands. From a community perspective, Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) describes the situation more accurately than the notion of the TBCA, which emphasises conservation more than sustainable use. Communities must be convinced that transboundary management programmes do not detract from the gains that they have recently made. Tension between conservation and development objectives is real, and TBCAs should not be an excuse for a retreat into the old fortress of "command-and-control" conservation.

During the twentieth century, African communities generally lost wildlife property rights on their own land and also land rights alienated to state-run protected areas. The policy separated wild animals from the ecological and economic systems of which they were an inherent part (Child and Chitsike 1997).

Although governments in southern Africa have been relatively progressive in promoting sustainable use, devolution is not complete. Wildlife, being both a mobile resource (traverses

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[1] Inkosi ya Makhosi, Mbelwa IV, a paramount chief in Malawi, asked Tanzanians at the Victoria Falls CBNRM Conference what they had done with their traditional leaders, as an entire generation has grown up without them, as the result of an action by an elected (but not mandated) government. The Maasai escaped this fate, as leadership does not manifest in the individual person as much as in the "age set" (e.g., elders).

tenure units) and a fugitive resource (its access rights move with it), provides an incentive for landowners to cooperate and integrate their conservation goals at a level greater than the management unit. The “new” CBNRM approach at this stage remains speculative and experimental, as tentative steps are made to move the paradigm from regulatory (negative sanctions) to community empowerment based on incentive-driven approaches. This process hinges on changing perceptions, attitudes, approaches, institutions, behaviours, and relationships.

2. Location of Components of CBNRM in the Context of TBCA/TBNRMAs

Three archetypal CBNRM approaches, covering a continuum of complementary strategies suitable in specific situations, have been identified (see Table 1 and Barrow and Murphree, forthcoming). These approaches are:

- ***Park outreach***, a suitable response for a protected area authority;
- ***Community-based management*** for landholders; and
- ***Collaborative management*** between land authorities.

Table 1. Location of Components of CBNRM in Context of TBCAs

Component	**Protected Area (PA) Outreach** *Conservation for/with the people*	**Collaborative Management** *Conservation with/by the people*	**Community-based Conservation** *Conservation by the people*
Whose agenda	TBCA development dominated by PA parties. Community neighbours are subsidiary partners to achieve PA conservation objective.	TBCA/TBNRM dominated by PA parties with communities slowly moving toward some joint management responsibilities.	Local community as legal land entities join protected area authorities as full and equal partners.
Who owns process	PA with conditional benefit flow to communities.	The state with concessions toward joint management and multiple use.	Community has legal rights of access.
Who plans	Joint planning only of outreach activities.	Joint planning of multiple-use access.	Community often assisted by advisors/administrators.
Who controls	PA authority.	Joint authority.	Community authority (democratic/traditional).
Ownership of resources, areas	PA controls relationship with dependent communities.	PA oversees unequal partnership.	*De facto* community, but depends on how well bounded/focused the tenure arrangements are.
Dominant objective	Enhanced conservation and integrity of protected areas and TBCAs.	Conservation of PA and TBCAs through managed access to multiple-use resources.	Rural livelihoods: needs met but conservation needs integrated.
Fate of conservation resource	PA core maintained for national heritage and benefit, but wider TBCA manifests land-use conflicts and fragmentation.	PA core maintained for national heritage. Benefits shared with local community groups and individuals. Use may not be sustainable and species may be affected.	Where resource is insignificant to rural economics or culture, it may be lost. Resource maintained when culturally/economically valuable.

All collaborative approaches must be premised on mutual respect between landholders, recognised through agreed upon structures, objectives, reciprocal activities, and equitable sharing of costs and benefits.[2] It is contended here that both park outreach and collaborative management should be premised on a community-based approach when communal land and natural resources are involved. Partnerships are a relationship of the highest trust, which only work when parties mutually serve their own and the other party's needs. In implementing CBNRM as a program, the core relationship between state and landholders was fostered by donor-supported nongovernmental organisation (NGO)[3] facilitation. While much CBNRM happens quietly by communities with no formal arrangement, the TBNRMA context is likely to require some CBNRM formalisation, especially in the proximity of protected areas and highly valued biological resources. (See Appendix for a contextual snapshot of CBNRM in the southern African region.)

In southern Africa, CBNRM has many broad commonalities, as well as striking contrasts, as illustrated below:

- All communities have a rich heritage of indigenous knowledge systems.
- All countries manifest a dichotomy between customary and statutory means of legitimating behaviour, especially with regard to land and natural resources.
- In few countries do women have security of tenure, in part, because of customary inheritance rules.
- All countries, except Angola and Mozambique, have a heritage of British-style administrative and local government institutions.
- Some countries (South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Lesotho) have higher population densities and hence, face more resource competition than others (e.g., Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, and Mozambique).
- South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Namibia face land-reform pressures consequent to their inequitable settler land apportionment systems.
- All countries have to confront agrarian reform in some way, partly driven by economic adjustment.
- Many countries, especially those with a heritage of centralised political and administrative systems, face governance reform involving decentralisation of authority and devolution of land rights.

[2] CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe was primarily designed as a community-based approach (Martin 1986), but it manifests several elements of collaborative management. The district as the "appropriate authority" must interrelate with various other structures; including government, ministries, wards, villages, other districts, traditional systems, private sector, protected areas, and TBCAs.

[3] NGOs, in this instance, includes academics and consultancies.

- Rural communities in the region uniformly contend with formal state dominance of informal community systems, rendering them powerless (co-opted, compliant, and dependent) in the policy arena.

- Communities have spent a century as dependent entities under colonial and post-colonial states.

2.1 Hierarchies Related to the Management of Community-based Resources

Today, communities in southern Africa exist under the rational-legal authority of nation-states.[4] Recognition of the juxtaposition of customary with statutory institutions is critical in understanding the utility of "community" as a concept in the context of CBNRM. Internally, rural communities manifest heterogeneity, differentiated and stratified on several interacting levels: lineage (position), gender (marriage, inheritance), age, and wealth--each relating to resource access. However, the statutory dominance by centralised power structures (governmental, NGO, donor, private sector) means that communities are construed as uniform tenurial (land) and governmental entities. "Community" in the CBNRM and TBNRMA context could be defined cynically as "*that unit of social organisation **permitted** to operate as such by the state*." The challenge to fit the construct of a TBNRMA (form) into the dynamic reality (shape) on the ground demands confrontation (honest dialogue) between landholders and between these landowners and national and protected area authorities. Farmers are the primary stakeholders in communal settings because their families have, over time, depended upon the ecosystem in which they live. Other parties' interests do not depend as directly and permanently on the local ecosystem (Dassman 1988).[5]

Community interests in agrarian matters are usually expressed through hierarchical levels of decision-making highlighted (see Table 2). At the informal level (micro) of household and village, several resource access conventions may be operative. These behavioural institutions interact with a more formal level (meso) of local government and chieftaincy, which, in turn, must link with the macro level of national law, policy, and its administration. Wildlife, because of its rarity value, ensures that much focus remains at the macro and meso levels, while less valuable resources are managed more at the micro, informal institutional level.

[4] Max Weber (1864-1920) identified three forms of legitimisation for authority in society: traditional, rational-legal (bureaucratic), and charismatic. Southern Africa manifests dualism between the first two, with ever-present populist possibilities for the third.

[5] Dassman contrasts "ecosystem" people, who depend on the local resource base, with "biosphere" people, who depend on global market access and do not directly suffer if a single ecosystem deteriorates.

Table 2. Critical Levels in Community Property Arrangements*

Function	Property Rights Institutional Level	Stakeholders
Coordination/oversight/regulation/monitoring at district/national level	Macro	State/local authority (RDC)/ chieftaincy
Common property organisation at territorial level (village/headmanship/district).	Meso (middle)	Community/ward/village unit (NRC)/grazing committee.
Common property management at the resource user (access) level of individual/household/village.	Micro	Resource users/ farmers/farm workers/households/groups/ individuals (honey/crafts/thatch/ grazing/hunting/gathering/ medicines).

* Note: See Footnote 6 below.

2.2 Customary CBNRM Institutions (from Micro to Meso)

The customary or traditional community stakeholder analysis in Table 3 indicates the complex micro and meso institutional framework, conditioned mainly by bloodlines, lineage, and marriage within which access to land and natural resources is largely controlled. It presents a simplified outline of the vertical linkages from household to lineage, with a modest gender perspective. The communal resource base presents an endowment to which many parties within a community may claim entitlement. Many informal institutions are not recognised or valued by policymakers and regulators, although their policies may impact upon peoples' livelihood strategies. Considering this complex communal structure, it is little wonder that any "community" would struggle to function as a distinctly unitary stakeholder in relation to "outsider" parties (e.g., state or private sector). The assumption of the homogenous community is partly contrived by external pressures and expectations for it to be so. However, for communities to function as institutions capable of effective decision-making, they need recognition and to know what their rights and responsibilities are, especially related to land and land-based resources.

2.3 User-group Institutions and CBNRM

If a community is construed as the proprietor or producer of natural resources, then, in terms of market relations of supply and demand, resource user groups could be held accountable for their consumptive use. While producer groups, for simplicity's sake, may be conceived of as territorial land units, user groups need access to resource niches that may traverse proprietorial areas to reach the products they need. Pastoralist livestock owners may move from range to range, depending on the seasons, crossing administrative boundaries as they track rich forage resource zones. In semi-arid areas, grazing cannot be managed purely within a territory but requires horizontal collaborative management between area-based regimes. Women, as a

[6] Table 2 is taken from an analysis given in a paper by Thembela Kepe (1997) entitled "Environmental Entitlements in Mkambati: Livelihoods, Social Institutions, and Environmental Change on the Wild Coast of the Eastern Cape," Research Report No.1. Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), Dept. of Govt. Un. Western Cape (SA).

resource user group that collects Ilala palm leaves for craft production, may come from different villages with a common interest in a particular resource at the micro level (e.g., Shashe/Limpopo TBCA).

Table 3. Customary CBNRM Institutions

Community Interest Group	Tenurial Grouping	Territorial Location	Right of Access
Household *Household Head (HH)*	Homestead family and dependants. Security of women depends on HH and his heirs.	Homestead area. Arable lands, common grazing, and access to natural resources in village and beyond.	Access/inheritance through HH. Control over arable land and grazing and domestic livestock through male HHs.
Village *Village Head (VH)*	A set of households, which comprises the primary management unit (group) for land and resource access. Presided over by a VH.	Village area. Stock of arable and grazing lands and natural resources bounded within specific territory with reciprocal inter-village access for strategic needs.	Mediation of intra- and inter-village access, inclusion/exclusion to resources, especially common property resources. Critical "gatekeeper" institution.
Headmanship *Headmanship Leader*	A set of villages that comprise the secondary management unit (group) of the lineage. Presided over by ward headman or subchief.	Headmanship area. Provides most of the subsistence livelihood needs of the resident, village-based households.	Mediates inter-village access to resources, as well as inter-ward reciprocal arrangements. Provides unity and solidarity for villages. Key coordinator function.
Chieftaincy *Chief*	Set of headmanships form tertiary management unit of the lineage. Presided over by chief (sometimes paramount chief/king).	Chieftaincy area. Provides for all the subsistence needs of headmanships, villages, and households.	Mediates inter-headmanship access and overall inclusion/exclusion to chieftaincy territory. Interface between customary/statutory management institutions.

The market-related interaction of user and producer groups concerns a relationship between resource demand and supply. Resource production, in relation to entitlement, presents a market pressure for allocation of scarce environmental goods and services. This allocation pressure is likely to be focused around key resource areas (riverine, wetland, arable land, grazing land, underground and surface water, aesthetic landscapes, wildlife, or forest). Many resource-rich areas, such as riverine alluvium soils, have had common property systems managing access to them for years. Table 4 provides a sample of resource user interest groups

that may have established conventions of access and operate mainly in the micro and meso levels of property rights institutions.

Table 4. Community-based Natural Resource User Group

Community Interest Group	Tenurial Grouping	Territorial Location	Right of Access
Livestock owners	Livestock ownership, especially cattle and goats, provides wealth for most powerful interest group.	Common grazing areas at intra- and inter-village levels. Opportunistic interest in rich forage niches.	Grazing access dominated by cattle owning; households who are power elite in local governance at all levels.
Artefact producers	Often women producing domestic artefacts and craft work for sale (e.g., ilala palm basketry).	Specific resources areas/niches, especially rich areas (e.g., riverine); cross-village access.	User group control through customary access (micro level). Threatened by formal access systems.
Food and herb producers	Women producing for domestic purposes/sale. Traditional healers produce for local and export use.	Specific resource niches; cross-village access.	Access controlled by user group with mediation from customary authorities.
Wildlife producer groups	Wildlife managed/co-managed at scale of village, ward, chieftaincy, and wider statutory administrative scale.	Entire village, ward, chieftaincy area set within district, trust, or conservancy area.	Access controlled by hybrid stakeholder combinations of ward, chieftaincy, and, statutory administrative territories linking meso and macro levels.

2.4 Natural Resource Governance Institutions

CBNRM must be nested within the national legal framework related to land. At the macro level of the state, only two basic frameworks have been provided, both versions of decentralisation. National governments have decentralised to statutory or traditional authorities, or some combination thereof. In no case in southern Africa have communal land rights been devolved to households and individuals (men and women). There is a critical difference between the top-down approach related to decentralisation and the bottom-up approach related to devolution of rights. The relationship between these decentralised governance institutions and community-based conceptions of ownership and use ensures that CBNRM remains relatively fixated at the interface between the community (meso) and local and regulatory authority (macro) levels of communal property management. Table 5 briefly summarises the overriding resource governance institutions, each of which manifests as a hierarchical structure.

Table 5. Public (Macro and Meso) Structure of Community Property Rights

Interest Group	Tenurial Grouping	Territorial Location	Right of Access
Local government structures	Village, headmanship, and district.	If communal land is legally state land, tendency is to link land and wildlife rights to local government structures.	Community manages wildlife through statutory structures (e.g., Zimbabwe). Contest between statutory and traditional authorities.
Traditional government structures	Village, headmanship, and chieftaincy.	Where traditional authorities recognised as land authorities, traditional authorities are important unit of management (e.g., Zambia, Namibia).	Zambia: chiefs' powers being modified toward democratic. Namibia: conservancy, but traditional authority influential. Botswana: civil society trusts with chiefs *ex-officio*. Zimbabwe: traditional leaders informal and *ex-officio*.
Regulatory agencies	Regulation through sectoral hierarchies.	Protected areas and statutory regulatory control of communal access rights to woodland, wildlife, land, water, grazing, and minerals.	All rights to commercial use of natural resources have to be legitimated by national legislation regulated by government.

3. Communities and Other Stakeholders

Given the complex situation regarding CBNRM, communities must be sufficiently organised to interact collectively and purposively with a powerful set of other parties, stakeholders, or partners.

3.1 Government and Communities

Government is a complex institution for communities to understand. It is political and executive, operating through a multi-sectoral set of agencies. It sets and administers laws and policies, and executes development projects. In the case of wildlife and forests, it is a regulator and, as a massive landholder, a neighbour. Government's wildlife agency functions as a "gatekeeper" (regulator/referee) involved in granting quotas, permits, and licenses; collecting fees; and monitoring and policing, as well as a party with vested interests.

Relationships can be confused when a partner is also a business rival and judge. Greater transparency is needed on the side of national wildlife agencies because they have a dualistic role of being regulators and facilitators. Regionally, southern African states are fixated on a political agenda related to national sovereignty issues, while economic, technical, and cultural cooperation lag behind. Governments have not afforded civil society much regional participation or vision thus far. Furthermore, southern Africa's rural communities, outside of local authority structures, are not organised or encouraged to represent themselves and participate in regional policy arenas. Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries could promote civil society participation through representative associations and in national- and regional-level planning fora.

The extent to which communities will be included in collaborative management arrangements by national authorities will depend on what role the latter see for the former, and whether communities are organised to assert themselves in the policy dialogue. The relationship between communities and the other stakeholders involved in CBNRM is largely conditioned by how far governments have empowered communities to be the masters of their own resources. Resource rights may be contested within communities; however, communities cannot effectively engage governments until they are formally recognised and have set up their own community-based organisations (CBOs). In fact, governments tend to see communities as a subset of the state.

3.2 The Private Sector and Communities

It is the value that the various forms of tourism[7] put on aesthetic and wildlife resources that has been a driving force within the CBNRM process. Communities have been motivated to reassess their land use by new resource values that can contribute to the development of their communities and household incomes. Before tourism emerged as a land use, most remote rural communities had little direct contact with the private sector. The concepts of resources as tourist commodities and communities as resource-based companies have presented new land-use options and the need for property-rights institutions.

[7] Tourism includes the following aspects of recreational experiences: hunting, photo-tourism, eco-tourism, adventure, culture, travel, and sightseeing.

From a community perspective, the private sector seeks to acquire exclusive access to a particular resource or area, or to form a joint venture for a particular marketing purpose. The private sector needs to make formal and binding arrangements with authorised community agencies, but routinely finds itself frustrated because, from its point of view, communities cannot make effective decisions within a reasonable time frame. Often, because communities are rigidly administered, the private sector will attempt to bypass communities to secure decisions at a higher level. This can lead to a lack of transparency, which, in turn, can lead to corruption and communities feeling cheated by their own authorities and alienated from "their" resources.[8] CBO linkages at the provincial, national, and regional levels hardly exist apart from Zimbabwe, where Campfire Association, as a CBO, can represent communities and liase with the private sector.

TBCAs/TBNRMAs might open up new opportunities for the private sector by unlocking the bureaucracy related to cross-border tourism and presenting new sites from which companies could operate. However, unless the TBNRMA is packaged in marketing terms, the add-on benefit is not clear. The Kalahari Gemsbok National Park (South Africa) increases accessibility from the South African side to the Gemsbok National Park (Botswana) side, thereby increasing tourism-generated revenue. The respective National Park (NP) departments have negotiated shared gate revenue. San communities in South Africa have been granted land rights adjacent to the park and usufruct rights within the South African portion. The Botswana government does not view this as a precedent for them to address their San communities in a similar way. Where communities lack recognised land rights, they may be excluded from being available as effective joint-venture partners. In such circumstances, they may only benefit from sale of labour, goods, and services, but lack any leverage based on proprietorship.

South Africa is especially keen to promote Community, Public, Private Partnerships (CPPPs), where state assets can be linked to community interests in order to leverage their stake in private-sector partnerships. These arrangements would be a high priority in South Africa's Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) planning. Several SDIs (Maputo, Lebombo, Wild Coast, and Trans-Kalahari) involve a focus on eco-tourism development and are also transfrontier in nature.

3.3 NGOs and Community-based Organisations

NGOs have played a significant role in all the CBNRM programmes initiated in SADC countries to date. Some countries have lacked a significant local NGO input and have had to rely more on governmental (Zambia) or consultancy (Botswana) input. Over time, the NGO role has been transformed through a process of promotion and facilitation to support and assistance of communities. NGOs involved with CBNRM have generally tended to be enthusiastic and committed in performing their role, and have been surprisingly cooperative with each other. They have facilitated the emergence of community-based institutions and have provided training to enhance community capacity focused mainly on resource, institutional, and financial management. The emergence of local CBOs is a necessity if communities are to protect and defend their own interests. This is a positive sign, although there is still little evidence of that

[8] In Zimbabwe, for example, the policy objectives of poverty alleviation and economic empowerment can conflict when communities are expected to give concessions to groups who may not provide the most reliable or competitive marketing services.

strength or capacity becoming consolidated vertically into national associations (e.g., Campfire Association).

The USAID's RCSA, which supports CBNRM, has contracted a consortium of NGOs (IUCN, WWF, ART) to support, through the SADC Wildlife Sector Technical Coordination Committee (WSTCU), regional linkages among communities, NGOs, government departments, and donors involved in CBNRM. The SADC WSTCU has successfully provided a collaborative and comparative thread to CBNRM activities, and the process has enabled a rich learning experience. In addition, the regional project brought TBCAs to the fore from a community perspective, where historical and cultural factors probably outweigh even economic considerations. In 1997, IUCN Regional Office for Southern Africa (ROSA) provided a grant under the USAID-funded Network and Capacity Building Programme (NETCAB) so that southern African NGOs and CBOs could be proactive in selected regional and international fora that impact upon CBNRM in the region. NGOs were supported with technical assistance, coordination, information, training, and funding to act as interim coordinators of CBO interests.[9]

3.4 Donors and Communities

The success of CBNRM in the southern Africa is partly based on the collaborative effort of various partner agencies: communities, governments, NGOs, practitioners, private sector, and donors. USAID's Natural Resource Management Plan (NRMP) and other donor programmes have facilitated a network of vibrant partnerships that provide a support framework for the CBNRM. This could be useful in implementing TBCAs, although additional parties may also need to be involved. The SADC Regional NRMP gave many community leaders and technical parties the opportunity to visit NRM activities in the region, thus providing a foundation of shared experiences and collaborative regional effort aimed at supporting sustainable resource use and conservation-based community development in the SADC region.

How will donors ensure that communities are institutionally engaged at local, national, and regional levels? Community leaders involved in this process highlighted their need for a TBCA at the Victoria Falls CBNRM Conference (1997). How a donor is mandated for TBNRM work is an important issue. For example, several NGOs are uncertain whether the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) is a donor, implementing organisation, or both. These NGOs do not clearly understand where community interests fall within PPF's mandate. As PPF has a high-profile, fundraising approach, there may be a tendency for them to emphasise the glamorous conservation objectives first and foremost. This highlights the concern of many communities and NGOs as to whether community interests are a primary concern of the parties advocating TBCA development. Donors may be formally required to negotiate on a regional and bilateral basis and establish some institutional involvement of a specific SADC sector.[10] The recent IUCN Representatives Meeting approved a regional strategic plan that included the objective "*to promote and facilitate a transboundary approach to natural resource and environmental management*." Transboundary issues were stated to include biodiversity, development, tourism, pollution, and desertification.

[9] Documentation on the NGO/CBO project facilitated by Africa Resources Trust (ART) can be found at ART and IUCN ROSA, as well as with the national NGOs that participated in the project.

[10] For example, the SADC Wildlife, Environment or Tourism sector. The tourism sector has been among the first to establish an agreed upon regional protocol. The Southern African Committee for Wildlife Management (SACWM), which involves only protected area authorities, is also a significant forum.

3.5 Research and Communities

Applied research has been an essential component of CBNRM, and will also have great relevance for TBNRM-related activities.[11] Through baseline studies, case studies and comparative analysis research have informed all the stakeholders, including communities. Social and natural science inputs have facilitated understanding of particular issues, conflicts, choices, and alternatives facing CBNRM. It may be tempting to view TBNRMAs idealistically, whereas the reality could be less romantic. It will pay to obtain an intimate insight into the precise situation-specific circumstances that occur in each TBCA/TBNRMA context, and to use that knowledge to develop adaptive management plans that can be monitored and evaluated. Research has played an influential analytic and advocacy role in ensuring that both development and conservation objectives are kept in sight simultaneously. The intellectual tension created by different disciplines, approaches, and ideological dispositions has provided an essential climate for viewing CBNRM as it is and within the context of national, regional, and global processes.

Good projects depend heavily upon good designs. These are most likely to be forthcoming when the appropriate research is done in advance and the findings and recommendations are fully debated at all levels. Research is also critical in order to defend policies and establish the most complete discourse possible. It is essential that critical insights are shared and debated as a basis for evaluating and selecting policies and programmatic inputs. The advocacy role of research, through which intellectuals harness their efforts with those of the communities, could be improved by garnering respect for IKS and active community participation. Research access to CBNRM situations could be guided by reciprocal agreements through which communities would be contracted partners in the process. Generally, CBNRM parties need highly applied and functional research inputs, whereas other stakeholders may appreciate more in-depth insights and analysis.

[11] Many disciplines have contributed (e.g., ecology, rangeland and wildlife management, resource economics, anthropology, sociology, and the social sciences generally).

4. Constraints Facing TBNRMAs from a Community Perspective

4.1 Summary of Main Constraints

1. ***Weak communal property rights*** over land, wildlife, and natural resources raises TBNRMA transaction costs.

   The single greatest weakness of CBNRM is aborted devolution of rights and responsibilities (costs and benefits) to the lowest appropriate level of social organisation for common pool resources.

2. ***Dualistic local authorities*** contest and raise transaction costs of TBNRMAs.

   Contestation between statutory and traditional authorities undermines efficient and effective management.

3. ***Confusion between governance and tenure*** raises transaction costs of TBNRMAs.

   Rights to land and natural resources should be with the landholders and not the institutions that represent them.

4. ***Community management takes time*** and has high transaction costs of decision-making.

   High transaction costs undermine the efficiency of CBNRM and TBNRMAs.

5. ***Large national programmes may marginalise community*** participation in planning and implementation.

   Programmes may be dominated by the interests of authorities, experts, and the private sector.

6. ***NGOs may usurp community mandates*** to fundraise.

   NGOs may not be sufficiently transparent or accountable in the management of access and use of funds.

7. ***Implementation may be a top-down process*** (as TBNRMAs involve national diplomacy and protected area authorities), reversing gains made since CBNRM projects began.

   Communities may be confused between TBNRMA projects and those over which they must retain their independence. Donors may allow the TBNRMA process to be blueprinted into a tight project framework. Communities, unlike other stakeholders, may be marginalised at the local level.

8. ***Communities will require further skills, capacities, and resources*** to effectively participate in the TBNRMA management process.

   Access to information and its management are important.

9. ***Cultural heritage aspects may be subordinated to conservation priorities***, but cultural and biological diversity are equally important to communities.

   Gender relations are essentially traditional. Neglect of gender-based resource access and use will negatively affect sustainability of CBNRM and TBNRMAs.

10. ***Protected areas may not provide adequate positive incentives*** to encourage compatible land uses.

    Rich protected areas lie alongside overcrowded and degraded communal areas.

4.2 Constraints Elaborated

1. Weak communal property rights

Early in the CBNRM process, five optimal principles were advocated that apply in TBCA or TBNRM contexts and rest upon devolution of tenure (access, proprietorship, etc.) (Murphree 1991). These five principles are:

- Giving resources a focused value so that communities can appreciate when conservation (management) benefits exceed costs.
- Differential burdens result in differential benefits (proprietorial equity within but not necessarily between communities).
- Magnitude of benefits should reflect quality of management (a positive relationship between active husbandry and harvest).
- Unit of proprietorship should be unit of production, management, and benefit (dualism should be avoided).
- Unit of proprietorship should be as small as practical within ecological and sociopolitical constraints (efficiency in collective action).

The prototype for these principles was established in the mid-1980s with respect to private farms and ranches in Zimbabwe and Namibia (Murphree 1995).[12] Namibia and Zimbabwe legislation conferred "ownership" or "custodianship" of wildlife resources upon the owners of privatised land. However, transfer of the private landholder model to communal lands is neither easy nor simple.

[12] Quoted from Murphree in Keynote Address of *The Commons Without the Tragedy: Strategies for CBNRM in Southern Africa*. Proceedings of the Regional NRMP Annual Conference, held in Kasane, Botswana, April 3-6, 1995. Liz Rihoy, ed. SADC WSTCU and USAID Regional NRMP.

The community **management units** analogous to private farms are not surveyed entities, although they may well exist in the social and ecological geographies of local culture and traditional authority. They may also appear on the administrative maps of local government, but frequently these have little economic or ecological rationale. Practitioners and policymakers are unsure what criteria to use in determining these units, other than they should be small enough to provide face-to-face interaction for all members. The fact that CBNRM struggles to achieve this may be good, as these units should be self-determined; but, in the short run, it makes initiation difficult.

The analogous proprietorial unit in communal lands is far more **organisationally complex** than the private firm or ranch. Its membership is larger and internally differentiated, not only in terms of its membership, but also in terms of its resource endowment and the fact that members have specific usufruct rights over arable land, as well as collective rights to the communal commons.

The greatest problem is the **tenure status** of communities on communal lands who lack strong property rights (i.e., "the rights of possession, use and disposal of worth").

These basic principles provide an "ideal type" that CBNRM and TBNRM policies and programmes need to approximate.

2. Dualistic local authorities

All countries in southern Africa have to confront and reconcile the issue of dualistic authority over natural resources, typically between property systems legitimised by statutory law and customary convention. Land rights can be vested in the landholder (freehold or lease), but in communal systems, where CBNRM mostly occurs, authority is generally located with elected systems, patriarchal chieftaincies, or both. In some instances, there appears to be an effort to foster a constitutional chieftaincy where traditional leaders hold authority but their power is tempered by representative governance. Dualism can be seen in the following examples:

- Authority over access and use may be granted through a democratic system, but actual management of land and resources is administered through customary communal form (e.g., Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Tanzania).

- Authority is granted through traditional institutions, but nascent democratic pressures push for executive accountability (e.g., Zambia, Namibia, and Malawi).

Legitimate authority[16] is necessary if the institutional arrangements for decision-making related to common property management are to be effective. The management of common-pool resources is also complicated because the joint management of undivided biodiversity may mean that the ideal unit of social organisation (community management) may not coincide with the ideal unit that needs to be managed (ecosystem). Ultimately, all human tenurial arrangements require collaborative endeavour to achieve the correct dimensions of scale. The joint management of a river means that tenurial systems should coordinate both horizontally (along the river) and vertically (watershed level).

[16] The term *authority* is defined as the power or right to control, judge, or prohibit the actions of others.

Countries in southern Africa and elsewhere are preoccupied with these issues. Those with a settler past of dualistic tenure (private and communal), such as Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe, are pressed by the need for equitable land distribution and tenure reform. Countries with a state socialist and centrist background (e.g., Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola), where state ownership was pre-eminent are challenged by land tenure reform to empower communities and the private sector. All countries have to confront how best to balance decentralisation from central to local government systems, the relationship between statutory and customary ones, and the need to devolve clear rights and responsibilities to land and a "bundle" of natural resources.

Both Tanzania and Zimbabwe have undergone substantial public land tenure reviews. In both cases, the fundamental recommendation for communal land was that rights should be vested in the people, the village assembly, and not in the council that represented them. Land rights were private and individual, first and foremost, and then had to be consolidated into group access rights, not *vice versa*. In both cases, the governments opted to decentralise to councils but not devolve rights and powers to the people.

The conceptual confusion between governance and tenure is, debatably, the most critical design flaw in CBNRM policies and programmes at present. Natural resource and wildlife use rights depend upon land rights. The private sector, now fully supported by the globalisation process, demands legal rights of access to land and natural resources. The indigenous communal sector has generally only been granted these rights through its local authorities' councils and chieftaincies, although trusts (Botswana) and conservancies (Namibia) are a positive refinement. The private model vests private rights in individuals or constituted groups, whereas the communal model tends to empower institutions before people. Communities face the challenge of developing common property institutions within the framework of customary and statutory law. The latter, formal law provides a rational-legal framework, but often the customary institutions determine the legitimacy of entitlements to specific resource endowments (e.g., grazing, fuelwood, water, fields, and medicines).

Is it possible to upgrade what are effectively second-class rights into full, registered ownership, with a diversity of options as to forms of ownership and internal rules? The following examples illustrate the region's struggles with this possibility at present:

- **CAMPFIRE** (**Zimbabwe**) authorised the district council (communal land authority) as an appropriate authority over wildlife. The district (some 3,000 km^2), with some 30,000 people, cannot be compared as a management unit to the private landholder on 100 km^2.

- **ADMADE** (**Zambia**) allows government to oversee communal wildlife use rights closely and distribute benefits through traditional authorities (land authorities). There is presently a policy change that envisages a separation of powers between chiefs and communities, with the former cast as symbolic owners and authorities while the people work through elected executive committees (constitutional patriarchy).

- **TRUSTS of Botswana** are democratically based and operate on the scale of controlled hunting areas and wildlife management areas. A trust is a legally empowered community-based organisation that elects members to a board.

- **CONSERVANCIES of Namibia** allow a community to define itself (generally traditionally) and its territory; once their intent and institutional capacity are ascertained, they are granted wildlife use rights (not full land rights). The relationship of conservancies to local authorities has yet to be clarified.

- **Community, Public, Private Partnerships (CPPPs) of South Africa.** Where a community has clear property rights, it has the formal basis for a joint venture; however, in many South African cases, either the transaction costs of achieving strong tenure are high or the value of the resource is low. In this situation, the government is keen that the employment opportunities should be maximised and state resources should support community resources to ensure that the private sector addresses the needs of previously disadvantaged groups.

3. Confusion between governance and tenure

Cousins (1997) states that, in the South African context "*at present the rights, duties, responsibilities and powers of the social actors and institutions operating at different levels within the matrix of communal land administration are ambiguous, conflictful and highly contested.*" He attempts a "messy matrix" in order to summarise the relationships in South Africa (see Table 6). Of particular note is the attempt to empower people rather than the institutions that represent them. This is necessary in order to provide a framework within which the 'democratisation' of land rights can occur.

The matrix highlights the attempt in South Africa to separate governance and tenure institutions by placing land rights with the people and allowing them to choose the institutions that would administer their communal land interests. Consequently, whichever local authority (chief or council) is involved, the institution will have to be accountable to the members in whom the rights reside. Once a community can settle this issue, they can tackle the common-property "checklist" related, *inter alia*, to boundaries, rules, sanctions, selection, and de-selection of office bearers, transparency, accountability, and constitution-making. Once all those steps are taken, a community could register itself as a **communal property organisation** with the same rights and responsibilities as a private landholder. It should be clear that, if the primary issue of who holds the land and resource rights is unclear, then the other aspects will be flawed. A rights-based approach to land and resource tenure would appear to be most in line with the wider policy environment related to civil society, market, and governance. It is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for sustainable CBNRM. Without clarity on this issue, CBNRM will continue to struggle to accommodate a flawed design framework. The tenure/governance issue underlies many of the lessons being learned in CBNRM in southern Africa at present.

Table 6. Ownership and Governance in Communal Tenure: A "Messy Matrix" Analysis

	Groups of Co-owners	Chiefs and Councils of Elders	Local Government Bodies	National Laws
Ownership rights	Policy suggests ownership should be vested in members of the group; some groups may accept ownership by chief or other bodies on behalf of the group ("in trust").	Many chiefs claim ownership on behalf of the group; most are resistant to claims to land by local government bodies; some accept that members are the true owners.	Need to acquire land for public purposes; many are resistant to providing services on privately-held land.	Will confer rights of ownership to members of groups, on condition that constitutional principles are adhered to (e.g., democratic processes, gender equality, protection of minorities).
Administration of land rights (e.g., allocation of plots)	Could elect a representative body to administer; OR could decide that local government administers land; OR could accept chief and council as administrators.	Many resist the separation of ownership from governance; BUT some accept that their role is that of administrators and not owners.	Could provide land administration services if co-owners decide that this is valuable.	Will attempt to clearly separate ownership from governance functions.
Land-use decisions (e.g., location of arable, residential, and grazing/wildlands)	Owners and users could decide; OR co-owners may allow administrators to decide.	Could assist in the administration and resolution of boundary disputes; OR make decisions on behalf of the group.	Assist in administration and resolution of boundary disputes; OR make decision on behalf of the group.	Will provide for rights of owners to make decisions on land use.
Ownership of land for public services	Co-owners could allow certain lands to be alienated to local government for purposes of service provision.	Could accept that local government owns land for service provision; many will resist local government owning land.	Duty to provide services to all citizens currently in dispute with groups and traditional leaders over land ownership.	Enabling framework of local government legislation, which needs to provide a clear role for traditional leaders.

Source: Cousins (1997).

4. Community management takes time

The management of communally-based resources necessitates collective decision-making. Collective action faces specific constraints, as follows:

- It is time-consuming because conflicts must be resolved before consensus can be obtained (inefficient management).
- Correct decisions may be compromised in order to preserve sociopolitical stability (ineffective management).
- Future interests may be mortgaged to satisfy present needs (unsustainable management).

The higher the transaction costs of communal decision-making, the less efficient the management of TBNRMA programmes becomes. The private-sector investor is aware that partnerships with communities face these problems, highlighting the necessity for devolution to communal property regimes in order to lower transaction costs of resource management.

5. Large programmes may marginalise communities

Stakeholder interests that are more easily mobilised at national and regional levels may marginalise community interests. If TBCA or TBNRMAs are perceived locally as elitist, their sociopolitical sustainability will be weakened. Marginalisation could occur, *inter alia*, for the following reasons:

- Protected Area authorities that do not fully subscribe to devolution may see TBCAs as a way of imposing and enforcing collaborative management structures. By drawing the TBNRMA agenda up to national- and regional-level governments, they may assert their influence over TBNRMA policy and process.
- Donors may perceive TBNRMAs as essentially a national and regional issue more than a local one.
- The private sector is mainly interested in access to resources and tends to leave issues related to local costs and benefits to be settled between communities and their governments.

6. NGOs may usurp community mandates

NGOs garner support from a variety of organisations (including urban and industrial groups). Where these NGOs implement programs for the benefit of communities, transactions and mandates need to be transparent to all parties. Often, NGOs involved in implementation are granted access to programmes by governments and do not need to establish a formal *modus vivendi* with communities. Communities may wonder what rights they have to funds raised by agencies that claim to have their interests at heart. From a community perspective, NGOs should be facilitators and capacity-builders but not the drivers and advocates of programmes that directly affect community interests without full discussion. Communities are not very

accessible to city-based NGOs, and as such, NGOs must be fully transparent and accountable when their actions may affect rural community interests.

7. Implementation of TBCAs/TBNRMAs may be a top-down process

Top-down planning and implementation is tempting because it appears as a concise and efficient exercise. In fact, it results in project implementers having to sell or impose their ideas on communities, which can dramatically raise local transaction costs. The individual TBNRMA situation may be ignored because of a generalised set of programme objectives and activities. For example, a large, centrally-run programme can become driven by high-level meetings and workshops that provide only for token community participation by leaders who become co-opted by the programme. Potential problems arise because communities rarely reject projects, hoping to gain some benefits. However, such activities can distort local processes during the project's life.

For example, Zambia and Zimbabwe wildlife authorities may take the management of the Zambezi River and the protected area complex on either side as primarily a matter for their consideration. The hippos, crocodile, fish, elephant, and river-based tourist resources are jointly shared, and the two agencies can hold meetings to establish common understandings. The community issues may only be added on later in a consultative, rather than a participatory, role.[17] It would be unfortunate if communities involved in CAMPFIRE (Zimbabwe), ADMADE (Zambia), and Tchuma Tchato (Mozambique), situated on the Zambezi river, were left on the periphery rather than becoming involved in a collaborative structure that includes government and community as landholders, as well as the private sector and NGOs as partners. The majority of transboundary situations have a protected area on one side only; therefore, the transboundary collaboration must include both governments and communities.

National authorities may make TBNRMA an issue where they take the lead role, rather than one where they work with other landholding and stakeholder interests. TBNRMAs may serve the "command-and-control" ethos, so recently mellowed by concepts of sustainable use, landholder rights, and private-sector partnerships. Authorities may move TBNRMA agendas as a series of bilateral, rather than local, relationships. This may also be reinforced by high-profile NGO initiatives that seem to pre-empt or threaten national mandates. Where there are protected areas on both sides of a national boundary, the authority of the protected area managers is likely to be strengthened, while that of communities could be marginalised.

8. Training and capacity-building

A flawed institutional framework will distort any amount of capacity-building and render community decision-making both inefficient and ineffective. It has been known from the start of the CAMPFIRE programme that a contradiction existed between the policy, which aimed to empower communities, and the law, which effectively empowered statutory local authorities,

[17] The Directors of National Parks in Zimbabwe and Zambia stated (to the consultant) that they believed that, where transboundary communities wanted to relate for positive management purposes, they should be encouraged. They felt it should proceed on a demand and strategic basis. Both Directors expressed fears that conservation NGOs would push a top-down process. Both felt that the Southern African Committee for Wildlife Management (SACWM) was a good regional forum for protected area authorities to establish their guidelines.

district councils. As a result, CAMPFIRE has decentralised rights and responsibilities to a governance institution but has not devolved tenurial authority to the people. People must engage in communal wildlife management through their local authority; hence, CAMPFIRE is a governance more than a land-use issue. In addition, elected councillors have aggrandised their authority at the expense of traditional authorities so people can play one system against another. Consequently, one witnesses the negative effects of dualism where a prospective settler can gain access to land through two doors: council or chief. Despite a decade of training input, CAMPFIRE is flawed in its design and foiled by "Murphree's law of decentralisation," where each tier of governance demands decentralisation of tenure and resists its further decentralisation.

Institutional structure and function are integral elements of CBNRM. It is ineffective to concentrate on improved function if the fundamental CBNRM structure is flawed. ADMADE, for example, is now, after a decade, attempting to move from total support of traditional authority to state support of a form of constitutional chieftaincy. As long as this has popular support, it may provide a significant change; however, a decade of capacity-building had been invested before this critical readjustment of management regime. The relationship between structural integrity and functional efficiency is central to understanding IKS. These systems are more than the sum total of indigenous knowledge held collectively by a community because, being contained within a system of authority, the knowledge becomes functional managerially.

9. Cultural heritage aspects subordinated to conservation priorities

Local communities living in transboundary situations desire cultural access more than traditional TBCAs permit. For a century, cultural, socioeconomic, and political systems have been contained by nation states, first bolstered by colonialism and then by centralised nationalism. While visionaries plan "peace parks," communities living on national boundaries are frustrated in meeting everyday needs (e.g., trading goods and services, sharing spiritual occasions, finding a marriage partner). Across the region, communities must ignore official borders in order to maintain cultural integrity.

At the Victoria Falls NRMP conference, 23 traditional leaders from 5 SADC countries issued a joint statement that promoted the establishment of a **Southern African Traditional Leaders' Council for the Management of Natural Resources**. The Council's proposed vision was that "*indigenous members of the southern African community come to understand the need to manage natural resources wisely and sustainably, through the processes of traditional systems and knowledge, and thereby improve the quality of life of all people.*" In their terms of reference, the traditional leaders established themselves as an Interim Council whose purpose was to develop a truly representative body of regional Traditional Leaders interested in NRM. Those leaders present would consult widely with their peers at home, with the aim of constituting the Council more fully and democratically later. This initiative has not been adequately followed up as an important regional initiative, although it is relevant to both CBNRM and TBCA/TBNRM

initiatives.[18] After an international conference on IKS and Biodiversity, the Secretary to the Traditional Leaders Council made, *inter alia,* the following observations:[19]

- Few African governments, particularly those from southern Africa, were represented.
- Participation of representatives of NGOs and CBOs from Africa was disappointing.
- As a region, African delegations were not prepared for the workshop and, as a result, did not have a common stand on a number of key issues.
- African delegations and delegations of Indigenous Peoples from other parts of the world had differing opinions and understanding about the application of the terms *Indigenous Peoples* and *Local Communities* as contained in the United Nations (UN) Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD).

The report, *inter alia,* recommended that:

- Africa, and southern African countries in particular, must develop a common understanding of the meaning of the terms *Indigenous Peoples* and *Local Communities* as used in the CBD.
- NGOs and CBOs in southern Africa should advocate for legislation of community/communal rights. This should be linked to Article 8 (j) and other related articles of the CBD. In addition, this should be linked to the review of Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) of the WTO. This will enable them in developing *sui generis* (unique)[20] regimes that acknowledge, recognise, and protect traditional practices and lifestyles contributing to sustainable use of natural resources.

Many Western donors and national governments still do not fully realise or accept the importance of the role that traditional systems can play in CBNRM. It must be admitted that, in terms of gender, formal access by women to both democratic and traditional authority is rare. It is the norm at present that land rights tend to be held by the head of household (male), who resides in his patrilineal home area. Certainly, individuals can, in principle, hold rights, but there are no examples in CBNRM of formal wildlife rights or benefits being earmarked to individuals rather than households, villages, or generally higher levels. Outside of marriage, women living on communal land remain dependent on their fathers or brothers for access to land. Women use natural resources, but their management ability is restrained because their interests, especially in formal settings, are co-opted.

[18] Traditional leaders present at Victoria Falls made the following selection of interim office bearers: Chairperson, Nkosi ya Makhosi M'mbelwa IV (Malawi); Vice Chairperson, Chieftainess Christine Eva Mambo Chiyaba (Zambia); Secretary, Dr. Mwananyanda Lewanika (Zambia).

[19] CBD Workshop on Indigenous Knowledge and Biodiversity, held in Madrid, Spain, Nov. 24-28, 1997. Dr. Lewanika presented a report to Africa Resources Trust, which had assisted his participation through NETCAB funding (USAID/IUCN).

[20] Culture and artefacts as commodities (e.g., music digitally sampled for Afro-rave records).

10. Protected areas may not provide positive incentive to communal neighbours

While parks authorities can readily engage donors and NGOs in a TBCA process, communities may have to wait for concrete proposals once the TBCA/TBNRMA concept has already been approved from above. With the notable exception of the Campfire Association in Zimbabwe, no other SADC country has a CBO organisation capable of participating in the national-level debates: and even CAMPFIRE does not provide a voice for traditional authorities or women. For example, a community-based project like Tchuma Tchato could easily be by-passed by higher levels and would need to assert its local perspective all over again. TBCA/TBNRMAs will remain a top-down phenomenon led by conservationists, trade interests, government politicians, and bureaucrats, unless they are supported with full community participation represented by legitimate CBO leaders. Communities welcome the positive prospects of seeing development opportunities in their areas, but not at any cost.

The Kalahari Transfrontier Conservation Area has been negotiated between national wildlife authorities. The South African National Parks and Land authorities have negotiated a land claim from the San (bushmen) of the Kalahari for 25,000 hectares of land bordering the Kalahari Gemsbok NP and for land-use rights over half the park. The Minister of Land Affairs is quoted as saying: "*From the beginning, I recognised the legitimacy of the San's claim. It is clear they lost their land rights and access to resources during the process leading to the creation of the park. The challenge now is to come up with a creative package to achieve the community's long-term viability*".[21]

It is salient to recall that, of the southern African states, only South Africa has been prepared to take a historical perspective of community land claims to the alienation of their land to national parks. Also, it should be noted that it took an NGO initiative to help the San push their claim. Botswana remains silent on the implications of the claim for their policy toward the San (also referred to as Remote Area Dwellers [RADs], along with several other groups). If the first TBFA to move toward formalised status cannot take account of the communities who first set foot on the land, then what hope is there for other communities to be considered unless they assert their own positions effectively. The San peoples span several countries in the western area of SADC countries. What prospects are there for an imaginative TBNRMA approach that recognises the great cultural heritage that the San (Bushmen) provide for the rest of the communities?

Boxes 1, 2, and 3 provide several subjective "snapshots" of current TBCA scenarios.

[21] Minister of Land Affairs, Derek Hannekom, quoted in the article "Sands of Time Run Out for the San," *The Star*, Thurs., Sept. 24, 1998.

Box 1. The Western Limpopo (Dongola)

TBCA Authority. Three countries (South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe). Before countries agree, landholders within each country need to agree. In Zimbabwe, three landholder categories (state, private, and communal) could create a conservancy form of understanding before committing to TBCA. To date, South Africa and Botswana have met; Zimbabwe has not, possibly because communal participants will impose high transaction costs.

TBCA Land Use. Zimbabwe practises consumptive use, while Botswana has photo-tourism. CAMPFIRE may hunt the trophy bulls that Botswana wants to show tourists. Botswana's lions raid Zimbabwe communal cattle, which sometimes graze on the Botswana side. Zimbabwe 's communal practise mixes agro-pastoral with wildlife, while South Africa and Botswana are moving into exclusive wildlife use.

Hard/Soft Boundaries. Military boundaries are softening, but boundaries on labour migration and veterinarian control are hardening. Meetings in Botswana between private and communal parties have led to a proposal to fence communities out. What equity do communities get when fenced out? What is the TBCA boundary? Can sociopolitical sustainability be factored into the overall costs and benefits?

Box 2. Kruger/Bahine and Zinave/Gonarezhou

TBCA Authority. Major stakeholders, thus far, are PA authorities, donors, and NGOs. The Makuleke community is in prime position with land claim in park on boundary, but this is atypical. Progress was slow at first, with World Bank project mainly focusing on capacity-building in Mozambique. In 1999, the pace picked up, and a technical committee of the three wildlife authorities is meeting routinely. This has been backed-up by a ministerial meeting, and the TBCA looks set to evolve with much private-sector interest.

TBCA Land Use. Collaboration between state, communal, and private landholders in Zimbabwe holds much promise, but shows little progress. Gazaland Tourist Promotion Initiative shows strong local interest. Communities in Zimbabwe and South Africa are known to be interested, but those in Mozambique remain dependent on state support.

Hard/Soft Boundaries. PPF TBCA map has caused some consternation that TBCA merely involves core protected areas, with a few communal buffer zones. Serious questions remain about whether TBCA is a territory or a process that parties can buy into. Hard boundaries will alienate local participants.

Box 3. Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique (Zambezi, Mana, and Cabora Bassa) (Campfire, Admade, and Tchuma Tchato)

TBCA Authority. Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Mozambique all meet on Zambezi, each with a border village (Kanyemba, Zumbo, and Freira), three national, and three community authorities. Zambia/ Zimbabwe authorities have discussed joint management of common resources, and communities have had informal ties. Positive possibilities for bottom-up, community-based approach is allied to collaboration with more formal national collaboration.

TBCA Land Use. All countries have a CBNRM project in the vicinity. The Zambezi River is a magnet for tourism (adventure, hunting, photo), as well as artisanal and commercial fishing (Cabora Bassa). There is high demand for commercial access and leases, and possibility of a road to Kanyemba and then north to Luangwa (Zambia), east to Cabora Bassa (Mozambique), or west to Mana Pools (Zimbabwe). It could provide good 4 x 4 camping route. Communities need support on enterprise development, marketing, and service industry.

Hard/Soft Boundaries. The area has been a historic centre for early trade (ivory and gold), and longstanding cultural and reciprocal ties have been reinforced through various refugee movements. Immediate Mozambican villages are closely linked (familial, trade, and social) with both Zambian and Zimbabwean communities. Great potential exists for informal local exchange, which governments could endorse.

Source: Murphree (1995); Wilson (1997).

5. Opportunities for TBNRMAs from a Community Perspective

5.1 Main Opportunities

1. Improved social security and welfare through more valuable, community-based property rights.

2. Improved livelihoods through diversified, income-generating, land-use options (i.e., may achieve more optimal land-use value).

3. Improved resource conservation and protection.

4. Richer cultural and social environment.

5. Improved collaboration with government.

6. Improved collaboration with private sector.

7. CBNRM programmes have laid foundation for TBNRM programme and TBCA linkages.

8. TBNRMAs may raise status of communities at periphery of countries and help to get their "voices" heard.

9. Communities can learn through sharing experiences.

5.2 Opportunities Elaborated

1. *Improved social security and welfare through more valuable, community-based property rights*

This opportunity is based on two main assumptions:

- That communal property rights over access to land and natural resources will become more secure over time for all communities, as well as, in this instance, for communities in TBNRM situations.

- Natural resources will become more valuable for rural communities, particularly for those communities involved in TBNRMAs. TBNRMAs will add value to resources already marketed through raising the scale and profile of local resources.

Social security and welfare are particularly supported by CBNRM activities, as they concern common property resources and therefore reward groups and communities through collective rental returns. Communities could also invest assets into ventures (e.g., rental income, land, and resources). For this opportunity to be fulfilled, a TBCA/TBNRM programme would need to ensure that community property rights were on a firm devolution trajectory.

2. *Improved livelihoods through diversified income-generation options*

This opportunity depends on TBNRMAs acting as a multiplier of CBNRM opportunities through attracting investment resulting from enhanced scale and improved collaborative planning within and between countries, as well as marketing related to TBNRMA marketing. Opportunities for individuals and groups within communities would relate to labour and sales of goods and services, as well as investments in tourist and natural-resource related businesses.

3. *Improved resource conservation and protection*

CBNRM has already established a foundation for this in many instances. TBNRM describes the process through which CBNRM can address situations where hard national boundaries prevent more optimal land-use options being realised. Many boundaries involve rivers that are key resource areas for community use and necessitate joint management to a degree to obviate real or potential land-use conflicts. A community on one side might plan a wildlife land use while one on the other side might plan an irrigation scheme. The Shashi River (Dongola) presents such a scenario. Collaborative intelligence and strategies could help prevent commercial poaching. All landholders (farmers) need to relate to their neighbours to ensure that security threats are minimised and possibilities of joint action are taken.

4. *Richer cultural and social environment*

Many of southern Africa's ethnic communities have been dislocated by national boundaries, and a TBNRMA approach could genuinely foster a local cultural renaissance. Socially, groups that perhaps feel marginalised by their location in regard to boundaries would enjoy the enhanced status and identity that cross-border collaboration and communication might give. IKS shared between ethnic groups could be harnessed effectively to support TBNRM and give TBNRMAs a special cultural context. A TBNRMA programme could foster meetings between traditional leaders, healers, resource user groups, crafts makers, trackers, guides, range managers, and others. Communities that were a minority on one side could have their pride boosted by identification with stronger groups across the border. Table 7 indicates the large number of ethnic groups that span boundaries in southern Africa (Asiwaju 1985).

Table 7. Ethnic Groups Partitioned by Boundaries

Boundaries	Partitioned Ethnic Groups	Boundaries	Partitioned Ethnic Groups
1. Botswana-Namibia	Ova Herero, Khoisan Basarwa, Bayei, Hambukush/ Hambasushu, Tonga, Subiya	2. Botswana-Zambia	Tonga, Subiya
3. Botswana-Zimbabwe	Va-Kalanga, Ba-Birwa	4. Botswana-South Africa	Ba-Tswana
5. Malawi-Mozambique	Yao, Sena, Nyanja, Chewa, Ngoni	6. Malawi-Tanzania	Ngonde
7. Malawi-Zambia	Chewa, Ngoni, Tombuka, Ngonde	8. Mozambique-South Africa	Swazi, Shangaan
9. Mozambique-Swaziland	Swazi	10. Mozambique-Tanzania	Makonde, Yao, Ngoni, Matengo
11. Mozambique-Zambia	Chewa, Ngoni, Nsenga	12. Mozambique-Zimbabwe	Barwe, Ndau, Manyika, Shangaan
13. Namibia-South Africa	Nama	14. Namibia-Zambia	Subiya
15. South Africa-Swaziland	Swazi	16. South Africa-Zimbabwe	Shangaan , Venda
17. Tanzania-Zambia	Mambwe, Inamwanga	18. Zambia-Zimbabwe	Balocolough, Tonga, Shona (KoreKore)

Source: Asiwaju (1985).
Note: This table includes some of the major groups; it is intended as an example and is not comprehensive.

5. *Improved collaboration with government*

The opportunity for communities to plan and work with their governmental representatives in a TBNRMA context could enable communities situated on boundaries to improve and deepen their ties with what often seems a distant institution. Joint planning within country could establish protected area authorities and communities and landholding parties with a common vision and purpose, as well as mutually beneficial strategies. Working with authorities and communities in other countries would tend to foster community and state authority relations, which would be beneficial to cooperation, coordination, and co-management.

6. *Improved collaboration with the private sector*

A TBNRMA might lend a CBNRM programme a higher profile in terms of market attraction than it would otherwise have. Collaboration with authorities and other communities on a larger scale would be more likely to present opportunities for communities to meet and plan with the private sector. The formality induced by the transboundary is likely to promote the need for communities to develop marketing strategies and joint-venture approaches from which communities can learn and benefit.

7. *CBNRM has provided a foundation for TBNRMAs*

Many of the communities who could be involved in TBNRMA developments have already been involved in CBNRM projects. They have started to address resource property issues, as well as institutional development and capacity-building. They have an appreciation of resource values and also some experience in resource and benefit management. TBNRM can be an extension of the CBNRM foundation and enable neighbouring communities to compare and contrast national differences and lessons learned. In addition, the prospect of

working with protected area authorities holds opportunities, as well as threats. Communities have a great interest in the land-use practices of their neighbours, especially when it has been so hard to have direct contact with them. The shared identity with neighbours could improve local confidence in a better future.

8. *TBNRMAs may raise the status of local communities and help get their "voices" heard*

TBCAs/TBNRMAs are bound to provide a higher profile for CBNRM programmes than these programmes would otherwise have because TBNRMAs have the ability to catch the urban imagination and attract press coverage. In addition, TBNRMAs will, at times, involve meetings between parties and partners, thereby raising the level of communication and interaction. In order to be involved in the policy and programme planning at all levels, communities will require effective representation. It will be critical that, at all TBNRMA-related fora, communities have an effective "voice." Communities are at their weakest in terms of being able to strategically advocate their interests at the national and regional level. If communities were able to effectively raise their voice, it would be surprisingly loud, and other sectors and constituencies would no longer be able to sideline or co-opt community interests. Well-organised communities could ensure greater recognition and support from government agencies.

9. *Communities can learn through sharing experiences*

The TBNRM context provides a process that encourages best practices to be emulated. Within countries, communities can only compare experiences within a given programmatic framework; however, in a TBNRM context, they can compare, contrast, and learn from other policies and programme designs. The tendency would be for communities to rapidly draw lessons from best experiences and advocate for improvements in their own management. This could be a rapid learning process, with those behind catching up and improving.

6. Interventions To Resolve Constraints and Enhance Opportunities

6.1 Summary of Indicated Interventions

1. Involve communities from the start of the TBNRMA process.
2. Treat TBNRM as an extension of CBNRM.
3. Improve communities formal resource access (property) rights.
4. Support development of CBOs to advocate and represent community interests at all levels (local, national, and regional).
5. Encourage IKS and participation of traditional leaders, healers, spirit mediums, and other persons with special knowledge of culture, environment, and history.
6. Provide training, capacity-building, and technical advice as and when needed.
7. Allow the process to develop before TBNRMA structures are put in place.
8. Support communication; exchange visits; and sharing of ideas, information, and experiences.

6.2 Interventions Elaborated

1. *Involve communities from the start of the TBCA process*

TBNRMAs should be taken as a process through which strategies and adaptive management plans can be made at the appropriate levels.

- Communities must be involved at the start of all local initiatives.
- Communities should be represented at national and regional meetings to voice their own concerns and to heighten their appreciation and status.
- Support for TBNRMA needs to be developed through active and ongoing participation in all the processes that affect communities directly or indirectly.

2. *Treat TBNRM as an extension of CBNRM*

- TBNRM is an extension of CBNRM and should be developed in relation to CBNRM initiatives.
- The comparative lessons learned through CBNRM should be highlighted through TBNRM to provide exemplars of best practices and pitfalls to avoid.

- Communities should be encouraged to develop compatible land uses and approaches that will mutually add value.

3. ***Improve communities' formal resource access (property) rights***

- Devolution of land and resource access rights must be fully supported to ensure that tenure, as a critical component of establishing a positive incentive framework, is secure and unencumbered by unnecessary negative sanctions and bureaucratic hurdles that merely raise transaction costs.

- Ensure that perverse incentives are reduced (e.g., high transaction costs on wildlife management and subsidised costs for livestock management, irrigation, and dryland cropping).

- Encourage a differentiation between ownership (supply) of environmental goods and services and utilisation (demand) for communally-based natural resources.

- Provide institutional support to both proprietorial and utilisation groups, as well as to the relationship between them.

- Support gender-based resource user groups.

- Help communities to appreciate the capital value of their resource stock and the benefits that can flow from improved management.

4. ***Support development of community-based organisations to advocate and represent community interests at all levels (local, national, and regional)***

- Encourage the formation of community-based producer associations.

- Foster the formation of national associations for community-based producer groups, including special interest groups (e.g., traditional leaders, healers, and user group representatives).

- Enable national community representatives to meet other national leaders and to participate in regional fora as an important stakeholder group.

- Ensure that important planning meetings do not take place without direct community representation.

5. ***Encourage Indigenous Knowledge Systems and participation of traditional leaders and healers, spirit mediums and persons with special knowledge of culture, environment, and history***

- IKS incorporates local social constructs of meaning and purpose in relation to the environment. This should be encouraged within countries and between them in the TBCA and TBNRM contexts.
- Traditional leaders can provide governance support to the process, and their participation is vital.
- Traditional healers can share and compare their knowledge and their market opportunities.
- Spirit mediums can provide awareness of traditional providence in the context of past, present, and future generations.
- User groups' knowledge and practices can be shared and compared.
- Mutual aid relationships can be identified and encouraged.
- Local history can be documented and shared.
- Culture can be nurtured for internal purposes, as well as contrived for sale in the tourist market.

6. ***Provide training, capacity-building, and technical advice as needed***

- Communities need assistance to develop their own adaptive management plans, including within the TBCA and TBNRM context.
- Communities require facilitation in order to develop strategic and project plans, including logical planning processes involving objectives and activities. They need this as much to compare with outsider stakeholders as for their own joint benefit.
- Communities need training in developing their own economic institutions.
- Communities need support, advice, and training in dealing with the private sector.
- Communities would benefit from raised awareness of the regional development of the tourist industry and what it means for them.
- Communities need hands-on resource management training to cope with specific situations (e.g., problem animal management, anti-poaching, capture, translocation, stock and range management, and camp development and maintenance).
- Communities need to be able to identify sources of support when needed.
- Managers need to be networked electronically with other managers.

7. *Allow the process to develop before TBNRMA structures are put in place*

- There is great danger in imposing structures upon people rather than allowing institutions to evolve on the basis of real need. When evolved through need, the institutional process is internalised; but when imposed, it remains external.
- TBNRMAs should evolve according to their specific situational and subjective circumstances and not be moulded into some overall framework or paradigm.
- Guidelines and criteria for TBNRMAs should not be allowed to constrain the potential for variety and development according to different priorities and motivations.
- It is possible that a set of guiding principles might be useful, particularly to establish that ecological, social, and economic aspects are all important and interactive and that the goal should ensure efficient, equitable, and sustainable management regimes.

8. *Support communication, exchange visits, and sharing of ideas, information, and experiences*

- Support should be given to boundary-based communities to establish communication with neighbouring communities in other countries.
- Communities should be facilitated to share information and experiences through exchange visits.
- A communication toll could be developed to link experiences between TBNRMAs.
- TBNRM should add to the learning process initiated through CBNRM.

7. Indicative Principles for Engaging Communities in the TBNRMA Process

TBNRMAs are transnational co-management arrangements and can draw lessons from multi-landholder conservancies, which provide an organisation parallel with TBNRMAs. A definition of the term *conservancy* has been given as: "*a contractually legitimated co-management entity which involves two or more recognised land and resource authorities formed for the use and conservation of natural resources on land under their jurisdiction.*" (Murphree and Metcalfe 1997). The following definition could be adjusted for a TBNRMA , which does not (at least initially) need to be as formal: "*a co-management area which involves recognised land and resource authorities formed for the use and conservation of natural resources on land* ***within and between*** *two or more countries.*"

This definition encompasses the organisational arrangements between the participating landholding authorities--whether state, private, or community. The authority structure and management framework would depend on circumstances and need bearing in mind that protected areas may formalise in a top-down way to the disadvantage of communities. A TBNRMA could be visualised as follows (Table 8).

Table 8. TBNRMA Visualised as a Co-management Landholder Entity Within and Between Countries

Communal Landholders (CBNRM)	**National Park State Land** *(facilitates partnership*)	**Private Landholders** *(game ranches, multi-species land use)*
Co-management / Collaboration between landholders within one country (e.g., conservancy).		
	TRANSBOUNDARY NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AREA	*TBNRM collaboration between communities, landholders and managers in two or more countries.*
Co-management / Collaboration between landholders within one country (e.g., conservancy).		
Communal Landholders *(CBNRM)*	**National Park State Land** *(facilitates partnership*)	**Private Landholders** *(game ranches, multi-species land use)*

Guiding principles might include, *inter alia*, the following:

1. ***Efficiency***--Low transaction costs and high local incentives encouraged by:

    - An enabling environment that ensures devolution of rights and responsibilities over resources to local communities, focuses costs and benefits, and removes perverse incentives.

    - Small, efficient government that does not impose high transaction costs.

    - Sound and supportive administration.

    - Positive leadership.

    - Incentive compatibility so that local economic interests in long-term ecosystem viability are compatible with those of other stakeholders who seek to preserve, or market biodiversity.

2. ***Equity****--equitable sharing of costs and benefits between stakeholders*

    - Sociopolitical aspects factored in, along with ecological and economic.

    - Stakeholders participate equally in planning and managing transboundary resources.

    - Gender equity is considered.

    - Respective roles of statutory and traditional local authorities are acknowledged and used.

    - Communities are empowered through secure tenure rights and capacity-building.

    - Democratic principles are adhered to, along with transparent decision-making and accountable authority.

    - IKS is respected and supported.

    - Partnerships are based on mutual interest, which is encouraged.

3. ***Sustainability****--Intergenerational equity*

    - Needs of ecosystem management are recognised.

    - Process-driven approach is encouraged.

    - Adaptive management strategies are supported.

    - Financial feasibility is desired.

4. ***Coordination***

- Vertical coordination between sectors and stakeholders is supported.
- Horizontal coordination between stakeholders in TBCA contexts is supported.
- Communication is supported (e.g., access to information, encouragement of dialogue, and support of community participation in discourse related to TBCAs and TBNRM.
- Peaceful approaches are supported (e.g., dialogue, noncoercion, democratic process, decentralisation, devolution, conflict resolution, consensus-building, tolerance, and respect).

8. Conclusion

Rural communities are pragmatic and probably support the notion of TBNRMAs provided the net gains outweigh the costs. This is most likely to be the case if the following are done:

- Stakeholders are clearly identified and their situations understood.
- Constraints to the process are identified and ameliorated.
- Opportunities are firmly grasped.
- The process is well coordinated and led and attention is paid to the guiding principles relating to efficiency of management, equity between parties, and sustainability.
- That the process is treated as a participatory and cyclical one that can run through stages (e.g., initiation of the idea, estimation of its worth, selection of approach, implementation of approach, monitoring, evaluation, and feedback into the participatory and adaptive process).

Finally, of all factors concerning communities, equity between stakeholders is probably the most important issue because without equity, socio-political factors will threaten sustainability.

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Appendix: A Contextual "Snapshot" of CBNRM in Southern Africa

1. **Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe** have experience with CBNRM-funded programmes and are developing policies that link communities with wildlife, tourism, protected area authorities, and the private sector. They have a CBNRM institutional and organisational infrastructure characterised by decentralisation/devolution of rights, awareness-raising, and project activities focused on capturing wildlife values at the local level. They are in an implementation phase, involving the mobilisation of landholding communities, their organisation, and capacity-building.

2. **Zimbabwe** is facing programme sustainability issues, but realises the need for policy to go beyond decentralisation to districts to devolution of rights to the communities themselves (Maveneke 1998).[22]

3. **Zambia** is re-focusing its policy to be less dependent on national and traditional authorities and more grounded in a democratic, community process.

4. **Namibia and Botswana** have designed community-based structures, which they are in the early phase of implementing.

5. **Tanzania** has pilot, community-based projects (Selous) and the National Parks Authority (TANAPA) has established a community conservation park outreach service. Given the country's favourable new policy environment, it could be well positioned to implement community-based approaches; but it remains to be seen if the policy will match the implementation and to what extent the various national agencies can collaborate.

6. **Mozambique**, remarkably, is establishing several new variations of CBNRM in a changing legal and local government environment.[23] Given its low level of infrastructure and capacity, there is a premium on efficient policy design that can harness incentives at the outset. Communities must get a voice in the policy arena as large-scale joint ventures, transboundary parks, and the like are on the agenda. The World Bank Global Environmental Facility (GEF) capacity-building project is necessary, in part, to build Mozambican capacity to collaborate more effectively with South Africa and Zimbabwe.

7. **Angola** has tremendous potential, but is currently hampered by sociopolitical factors. Its eastern border with Zambia and southeastern border with Namibia would appear ideal for an extensive CBMRM and TBNRMA approach. Population density in that region is low, though key resource zones in arid areas are probably highly prized (riverine areas and alluvial soils). Possibly, this region presents a genuine possibility for a peace park approach, partly based on the cultural heritage of indigenous systems centred on the Lozi (Barotse) Kingdom of western Zambia.

8. **Lesotho**, surrounded by South Africa, could be poised to find its feet with adventure tourism, given its spectacular high mountains and rivers. Currently, much of its present land

[22] The Late Tap Maveneke, CEO of the Campfire Association, argued recently that devolution needed to move further down toward communities, but that land itself was under the district. (ART tenure workshop paper, "Decentralization in Campfire: Current Issues and Constraints.")

[23] Mozambique's proto-CBNRM project, Tchamu Tchato, in Tete Province, provides a hint of the potential for CBNRM in that country.

use is under community-based rangeland management. Governance issues are problematic and, as of recent times, transboundary relations may take on features of peace parks.

9. **South Africa** provides an interesting CBNRM context. Community interests have been supported by the recognition of legitimate land claims by the new political dispensation. The relatively sophisticated private sector is pressing to formalise joint-venture agreements with communities in strategically resource-rich areas, driving the need for communities to have recognised property rights. The Department of Land Affairs (DLA) states that communal land rights should not be inferior to private land rights merely due to their historical neglect. It is offering communities the right to form registered communal property associations to assist effective collective action over land and resources.[24] South Africa has a strong NGO conservation constituency and a private-sector interested in investment opportunities for tourism and natural resource use. South Africa is now promoting Community Private Public Partnerships (CPPP) as its brand of CBNRM.

[24] This would be along the lines of Namibia's conservancies and Botswana's trust structures, but would include land and natural resource rights. Considerable extension work is required to facilitate this difficult institution-building process, but several CBNRM opportunities exist, not least in the TBCA context (e.g., Kwa-zulu/Natal and Mozambique; Maluleke/Kruger and Zimbabwe and Mozambique; Limpopo environs; along the Botswana and Namibia borders).

List of Contacts:

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Mozambique Bernado Ferraz - Minister of Environment Howard Geach - Blanchard Concession Simon Munthali - WB, GEF	**Namibia** Chris Brown - Namibia Nature Foundation Jennie Storm - NNF
South Africa Dr O Borquin - Game Rangers Assoc. Noel de Villiers - Open Africa Nic Ellengogen -Theater for Africa Salim Fakir - IUCN-SA John Ledger - EWT Dr I Macdonald - WWF-SA Lamson Makuleke -Makuleke Community James Murombedzi -Ford Foundation Conrad Steenkamp -EWT Achim Steiner - World Dams Commission (ex-IUCN ROSA) Julian Sturgeon - ART-SA	**Tanzania** Patrick Bergin - AWF Deborah Kahatano - EPIQ Rugemeleza Nshala - Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT) Mark Renzi -EPIQ NRM project Ron Ruyabal - USAID NRMP SO2 Peter Toima - Maasai Advancement Assoc. (MAA)
Zambia Chieftainess Christine Chiyaba - Traditional leader for Zambezi River area. Mr G Kayukwa - Wildlife Conservation Society Manyananda Lewanika - Secretary SADC Traditional Leaders Association for NRM Henry Mwima - NPWS, Chief of Research Mr L. Simwanda - Environmental Conservation society of Zambia	**Zimbabwe** Willas Makombe - Director NPWLM Rowan Martin - SASUSG Marshal Murphree - CASS, UZ Mike Murphree - SASUSG Calvin Nera - CASS, UZ Allan Sparrow - CESVI & BFA ZimTrust Campfire Association Board & Executive Chiredzi & Chipinge Rural District Councils Malilangwe Conservancy Save Valley Conservancy Wildlife Producers Association WWF Harare Office

[i] A comprehensive foundation bibliography was compiled through the USAID-funded regional NRMP. See SADC Wildlife TCU/Africa Resources Trust (1996). SADC Wildlife TCU/NRMP, Dept. of National Parks and Wildlife, P.O. Box 30131, Lilongwe 3, Malawi or Africa Resources Trust, P.O. Box A860, Avondale, Harare, Zimbabwe. (It is catalogued in Pro Cite.)

[ii] A discourse must be seen as a major phenomenon of social power, and not simply a way of describing the world. An important aspect of Michael Foucault's (1926-1984) conception of discourses was that, in part at least, social phenomena are constructed from within a discourse--there are no phenomena outside discourse. As a particular discourse becomes established, it may be challenged by a counter narrative, which attempts to provide a better explanation (Roe 1991, 1995). This dialectical movement of ideas through time need not inevitably produce an either/or set of alternatives, but may reach an optimal solution--a both/and "positive sum" (Uphoff 1992).

[iii] It should be noted that TBNRMA is a term developed during this study and that, to date, discourse in the region has centred on TFCAs and TBCAs (Transfrontier and Transboundary Conservation Areas).